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While the construction of the word "issue" has given rise to
a vast amount of litigation, there is comparatively little to be
found upon the subject in our American legal literature, either
in the more general treatises upon real property and upon wills,
or in special papers published in the legal periodicals. And
there is particularly lacking a discussion of certain observable
tendencies to be discerned in the more recent cases dealing vith
this problem. Ledwith v. Hurst,1 decided last June by the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania, well illustrates the difficulty in-
volved. The material facts of the case were these: a testator
gave realty in trust, the income to be paid to his wife, Caroline
Buchmiller, and his daughter, Mary Ledwith, in equal shares
during their lives, and to the survivor for her life; after the
death of the survivor the income was given "to the issue and
descendants of my said daughter, Mary Ledwith, if any, per
stirpes, for and during their natural lives, and the life of the
survivor of such issue and descendants; and in the event of the
death of my said daughter, Mary Ledwith, without leaving issue
and descendants, then at that time, or upon the death of the last
of such issue or descendants, if any, I order and direct my ex-
ecutors to sell, etc." Then followed a provision that the pro-
ceeds of such sale should be equally divided among several named
charities. All of the limitations above recited were held to
fail; and the property passed under the laws of intestacy to the
widow and daughter mentioned, as heirs. The court declared
that there was a "flagrant violation" of the Rule against Per-
petuities, and that the life estates of the widow and daughter
were so intimately connected with the general scheme that the
whole must fail. A correct construction was of particular im-
portance in this case, because upon it hinged the application of the
Rule against Perpetuities. As a consequence of the construction
adopted, not only the gift to the issue failed, but also the several
benefactions to charity limited thereafter.
Six constructions for the word "issue" will be stated and dis-
cussed, and in connection with each the Rule against Perpetuities
will be considered if applicable. From the discussion of these
several constructions it will be the writer's aim to develop certain
principles which will point the way toward the desirable result
in the case above mentioned.
- The writer desires to acknowledge his indebtedness to Profeszor W. R.
Vance of Yale University Law School for many kind suggestions and
criticisms made during the preparation of this article.
(1925, Pa.) 130 Atl. 315.
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First Construction: In a Testamentary Gift to "Issue" Fol-
lowing a Particular Gift to the Ancestor, the Word "Issue" May
Be a Word of Limitation, Creating an Estate Tail in the Ancestor
of the Issue Where the Gift Is of Realty, and an Absolute In-
terest Where the Gift Is of Personalty. As the foregoing state-
ment indicates, this construction is possible only in the case where
the devise or bequest to the issue is in the form of a remainder
after a particular estate in the ancestor. The typical case is a
devise to "A for life, and after his death to his issue." Here the
Rule in Shelley's Case will operate to create an estate tail in A,
in the absence of a restraining context.
All lawyers are more or less familiar with the distinction taken
between "words of purchase" and "words of limitation". It is
the function of the former to point out "purchasers",-to desig-
nate thd donees who take the gift directly from the donor; of the
latter, to delimit or describe the quantum of the estate which
passes.2 In the days before any estate in fee could be alienated
so as to defeat the heir, there were no words of limitation;
what we would now term such were really words of purchase.
"Heirs" and "heirs of the body" were intended to indicate a series
of persons taking directly from the donor, the estate of any one
depending on that of his predecessor only in the sense that his
relationship to such preceding holder fixed his right to the suc-
cepsion.3 After the rule became established in the feudal law
that the heir general could be defeated by a conveyance of the
ancestor in the latter's lifetime, "heirs" lost its original signif-
icance; it now served merely to indicate that the estate conveyed
was of such a sort that it would pass to the heir general if not
alienated by the ancestor, and that it would likewise pass to the
heir of any alienee to whom the first holder might transfer it.4
The word had now become one of "limitation". By a some-
what similar process of development the phrase "heirs of the
body" also lost its original force as a strict expression of "pur-
chase", and became in effect merely one of "limitation", designat-
ing an estate of such a sort as would pass, not to the heir general,
but to the lineal heir only, if the entail was not docked by one
of the permissible methods.5 It is perhaps apparent from the
foregoing discussion that words of limitation always contain
within themselves the idea of this series of persons related to
one another in the prescribed manner, so as to be able to succeed
2 1 Preston, Estates, 35-6, 38; Williams, Real Property (22d ed. 1914)
147; 1 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920) 44-5.
3 2 Blackstone, Commentaries,* 56-7; Williams, op. cit. 66-9; Leake, Prop-
erty in Land (2d ed. 1909) 23.
4 Leake, loc. cit.; Williams, op. cit. 352; Tiffany, op. cit. 44-5.
G Williams, op. cit. 147-8, 352; Leake, op. cit. 25-6, 134.
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to the gift; or, as we would now say, who can take from one
another by descent.0
In approaching the problem of construing the word "issue", it
is highly important to consider the nature of the instrument in
which the word is used. In a deed creating only legal interests
as distinguished from equitable, "issue" is always a word of pur-
chase.7 This construction follows necessarily from the rule, the
historical origin of which is suggested in the preceding para-
graph, that the word "heirs" is just as essential to the creation
of a fee tail inter vivos as it is to a fee simple. No other word
suffices. While the requirement of words of limitation for a con-
veyance in fee by deed has been abrogated in most jurisdictions
by statute, the common law rule that "issue" in such an instru-
ment shall be construed as a word of purchase still remains. The
word "heirs" was never indispensable in a will, however, for
any words indicating the intention to create a fee simple or
fee tail were sufficient to accomplish that end., Conveyances
creating equitable interests, such as marriage settlements, were
construed rather after the manner of wills than of deeds when
necessary to effect the purpose of such an instrument.0
The word "issue", when used in a testamentary disposition, has
often been said to be prima. facie the equivalent of "heirs of the
body", and, therefore, a word of limitation. "The term embraces
descendants of every degree whensoever existent, and, unless
restricted by the context, cannot be satisfied by being applied to
descendants at a given period. The only mode by which a devi'e
to the issue can be made to run through the whole line of objects
comprehended in the term is by construing it as a word of limita-
tion synonymous with heirs of the body, by which means the
ancestor takes an estate tail; an estate capable of comprising in
r See Williams, op. cit. 148.
7 Coke, LittletDn, *20a; Blackstone, op. cit. snp'e note 3, at '115; ,eI:c-
piece v. Fletcher (1735, C. P.) Comyns, 457; Mcllzinny '. McIIiJmnj
(1894) 137 Ind. 411, 37 N. E. 147; Pricc v. Sisson 11860) 13 N. J. Eq. 163
(aff'd in Weehav.ken Ferry Co. v'. Sioson, 1861, 17 N. J. Eq. 475). Sc2
also Ginger d. White v. White (1742, C. P.) Willes, 348; Kzight r. EM3
(1789, Ch.) 2 Bro. C. C. *570, -578; Doc d. Coopcr r. Collin (1791, K. B.)
4 T. R. 294; Paxton v. Lefferts (1831, Pa.) 3 Rawle, 59; Rtldhib , io. RaMd
(1914) 88 Conn. 292, 91 AtI. 198 (holding that "descendants" is not suffi-
cient in a deed to make an estate tail); Adaias z'. Ross (1860) 30 N. J. L.
505 ("children" not sufficient).
The rule in South Carolina is now contrary. Williems v. Ge,!'c (1909)
83 S. C. 265, 65 S. E. 241. Formerly the decisions were in accord with the
usual rule. Markley v. Singlctary (1860, S. C.) 11 Rich. Eq. 393. See
also, Dick v. Ricker (1906) 222 Ill. 413, 78 N. E. 823.
8 Leake, op. cit. stpra note 3, at 126; Williams, op. cit. s'npre note 2,
at 259.
0 1 Preston, op. cit. sip;a note 2, at 392; 1 Hovenden, Sapplemcnt t)
Vesey JuAior's Reports, *54. See also Williams, op. cit. szprv note 2, at
185-6.
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its devolution, though not simultaneously, all the objects em-
braced by the word 'issue' in its largest sense." 10 That this is
the view of the English cases is clear.11 Doubtless this idea of
the equivalency of "issue" and "heirs of the body" arose out of
the constant use of "issue" in limiting a remainder after a fee
tail; "to A and the heirs of his body, and if A dies without issue,
then, etc.", was the regular formula. In accordance with this
rule of primca facie construction, a devise to "A and his issue"
normally creates an estate tail in A;12 and a devise to "A for
life, and after his death to his issue", normally creates an estate
tail in A by operation of the Rule in Shelley's Case.13 If it suffi-
ciently appears from the context that "issue" was intended to
be a word of purchase, it will be so construed; the attempt is to
effectuate the intention of the testator as indicated in his lan-
guage.14 As the principles of construction are not precisely the
same with respect to the use of "issue" in bequests of personalty,
there will first be considered its meaning in devises of land.
Where the accompanying context justified the inference that
"issue" was intended to be a word of purchase, even a devise to
"R. R. and his issue, lawfully begotten", was construed as giving
but -a life estate to R. R."r There was in that case a failure of
10 2 Jarman, Wills (6th Am. ed. 1893) 403.
U.Ibid; Leake, op. cit. supra note 3, at 137; Theobald, Wills (7th ed.
1908) 412; Woodhouse v. Herrick (1855, Ch.) 1 K. & J. 352; Kavanagh v.
Morland (1853, Oh.) Kay, 16; Roddy v. Fitzgerald (1857) 6 H. L. Oas.
*823.
12 Leake, loc. cit. supra note 11; Theobald, loc. cit. supra; Parkin v. Knight
(1846, Ch.) 15 Simons, 83. A recent American case is Packer's Estate
(1914) 246 Pa. 116, 92 Atl. 70.
13 Leake, op. cit. supra note 3, at 138; Theobald, op. cit. supra note 11,
at 422; Woodhouse v. Herrick, suprl note 11; Kavanagh v. Morland, supra
note 11; Roddy v. Fitzgerald, supra note 11.
14 "There is, however, a third class of cases where a testator uses in hiu
will an expression, in its ordinary use not of a technical nature, and ca-
pable of more meanings than one. . . . The first point, therefore, to
be considered is-whether 'issue' be a word of this nature. Now we think
that this sufficiently appears, from referring to the various authorities
... . In all of them it is treated as a word capable of being used in
different senses, either as including all descendants, in which case it is of
course a word of limitation, or as confined to immediate descendants, or
some particular class of descendants living at a given time. Probably it
will be found most frequently used in the former sense, and it therefore
most frequently has the effect of giving an estate tail to the ancestor. It
might even, perhaps, be conceded that this is prima facie its meaning. But
the authorities clearly shew, that whatever be the prima, facie meaning of
the word 'issue', it will yield to the intention of the testator to be collected
from the will; and that it requires a less demonstrative context to show
such intention, than the technical expression of 'heirs of the body' would
do." Alderson, B., in Lees v. Mosley (1836, Exch.) 1 Y. & C. 589, 607, 608.
For similar expressions of judical attitude, see Ginger d. White v. White,
supra note 7; Doe d. Cooper v. Collis, supra note 7.
1"Hockley v. Mawbey (1790, Ch.) 1 Ves. Jr. 143. See also 2 Jarman,
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issue at the death of R. R.; but it is clear that the court regarded
the limitation as creating a contingent remainder in favor of
the issue as purchasers. Courts have felt much less difficulty,
in construing "issue" as a word of purchase than in similarly
interpreting "heirs of the body". 10 The context which will in-
duce construction as a word of purchase must contain words of
distribution, as that the issue shall take equally, or as tenants
in common, or equivalent expressions inconsistent with the idea
of the issue taking successively as tenants in tail. Superadded
words of limitation are not usually sufficient by the English
rule.17 Formerly it was required that there be also words ade-
quate to carry a fee to the issue ;18 but this is no longer necessary
in England, as under the Wills Act of 1837 every devise without
qualification gives a fee simple if the testator has one. Similar
statutes are common in this country. The rule of construction
subsequently to the Wills Act in England has been thus sum-
marized: "Every devise to a person for life, and after his de-
cease to his issue, in words which direct or imply distribution
op. cit. supra note 10, at 406; Theobald, op. cit. supra note 11. Compare
a recent American case, Rhode IslaMd Hospital Trust Co. v. Bridghmn
(1919) 42 R. I. 161, 106 Atl. 149.
10 See extract from the opinion of Alderson, B., supra note 14; Kavanagh
v. Morland, supra note 11; Woodhouse z. Hcrrich, s21pra note 11; the opin-
ions of Channell, B., Watson, B., Crompton, J., and Lord Wensleydale in
Roddy v. Fitzgerald, supra note 11; Powcll v. Board of Domcstic Mi'iofws
(1865) 49 Pa. 46; T imaines v. Dugan (1876) 46 Md. 402; Ncs v. Ramsay
(1893) 155 Pa. 628, 26 AtI. 770; Daniel v. Whartenby (1873, U. S.) 17
Wall. 639.
For illustrations of the difficulty felt in the English courts with respect
to the construction of "heirs of the body" as words of purchase, Fee Je,-
son v. Wright (1820, H. L.) 2 Bligh, 1; Jordan v. Adams (181) 9 C. B.
(N. s.) *483. Many of the American decisions evince a more liberal at-
titude in construing "heirs" or "heirs of the body". See Acta2 Life Inaur-
anee Co. v. Hoppn (1914, C. C. A. 7th) 214 Fed. 928 ("the heirs of the
body of S., their heirs and assigns" held to be words of purchase in a re-
mainder); Blythe v. Goode (1920, C. C. A. 4th) 269 Fed. 544 (like the
preceding case); Simonton v. White (1899) 93 Tex. 50, 53 S. W. 339
("bodily heirs" construed as "children") ; Mills v. Thornzo (1880) 95 N. C.
362 ("heirs" held a word of purchase). See also Carlton v. Price (1851)
10 Ga. 495 (bequest of slaves to A. for life, with gift over to his "heirs of
the body"; held that A. took only a life estate and not the absolute prop-
erty).
27 A summary of the English cases may be found in 2 Jarman, op. cit.
supra note 10, at 416. Superadded words of limitation descriptive of heirs
of the same species as the "issue" did not make "issue" a word of purchase.
Ibid. at 409. Nor did a limitation to the heirs general of the issue. Ibid.
at 410. But superadded words of limitation which narrowed the course
of descent did convert "issue" into a word of purchase. So where there is
a limitation to "A for life, and after his death to his issue, and to the hcirs
male of such issue". Ibid. at 414-5.
1s Woodhouse v. Herrick, supra note 11; Roddy v. Fitzgerald, aupra note
11. That words of distribution together with words sufficient to carry a
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between the issue, gives the issue an estate in fee in remainder
by purchase." 19
A study of the English cases suggests a grave doubt whether
the courts of that country have really observed the solicitude for
the intention of the testator which they have so often pro-
fessed.20  At a time when, and in a country where, estates tail
were so common as to be familiar, even in respect to their pe-
culiar phraseology of creation, to laymen as well as to lawyers,
it was perhaps a fair rule that prima facie "issue" was intended
to be a word of limitation. And yet one wonders if any testator
since the fifteenth century ever actually intended words in a
remainder limited after a life estate expressly given to be words
of limitation effective to make a fee tail in the one named as
tenant for life. It is certainly hard to understand why the
English courts should have required such overwhelming evidence
of a contrary intention. Why were not superadded words of
limitation, alone, enough? Or words of distribution, alone?21
The American courts have almost uniformly acquiesced in the
English rule that in a will "issue" is prima facie a word of limi-
tation.22 Because of the statutes, before mentioned, making every
unqualified devise pass a fee simple, it is believed that many of
fee to the issue were enough: Lees v. Mosley, supra note 14; Greenwood
v. Rothwell (1843, C. P.) 5 M. & Gr. 628.
19 2 Jarman, op. cit. supra note 10, at 422.
20 In Ginger d. White v. White, supra note 7, at 351, Willes, C. J., said:
Why does the word issue in a will signify the same as heirs of
the body? Only because it may be supposed that the testator, who was
ignorant of the law, intended it should have that construction. It does
not therefore vi [ex] termini create an estate tail in a will as 'heirs of
the body' do in a deed, but only where it appears to be the intent of the
testator that the word should have that construction, or at least that it
does not appear that the intent of the testator was otherwise.
"In order therefore to find out what- construction is to be put upon the
words of a will, we ought in the first place to consider what the intent
of the testator is, though this I am afraid is too often the last thing that
is thought of."
21 Itmay be noted that the English courts have not always seemed
satisfied with their rule of prima facie construction. Several judges have
expressed the view that the popular meaning of "issue" is "children". See
the opinions of James and Brett, L.JJ., in Ralph o. Carrick (1879, 0. A.)
11 Oh. D. 873; In re Hiekey [1917, C. A.] 1 Oh. D. 601. On this point
compare the following American cases: Soper v. Brown (1892) 136 N. Y.
244, t32 N. E. 768; Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Bridgham, supra
note 15.
22 So, a limitation to "A and after his death to his issue" normally
creates an estail tail in A. Gonzales v. Barton (1873) 45 Ind. 295; Gard.
ner v. Anderson (1924) 114 Kan. 778, 116 Kan. 431, 227 Pac. 743; Zabris.
kie v. Wood (1872) 23 N. J. Eq. 541; Wright v. Gaskill (1908) 74 N. J.
Eq. 742, 72 Atl. 108; Kingsland v. Rapelyo (1834, N. Y.) 3 Edw. Ch. 1;
Kleppner v. Laverty (1871) 70 Pa. 70; Armstrong v. Michener (1894) 160
Pa. 21, 28 Atl. 447; Grimes v. Shirk (1895) 169 Pa. 74, 32 Atl. 113;
Stayman v. Paxson (1908) 221 Pa. 446, 70 Atl. 803; Hall's Ex'r v. Smith
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our American decisions can be brought within the English rule
requiring words of distribution together with language sufficient
to pass the fee.' 3  That any American tribunal should be more
insistent upon a construction creating an estate tail than the Eng-
lish courts would be, seems incomprehensible; yet that has occa-
sionally been the fact." On the whole the American view has
been more liberal. Thus, in a number of jurisdictions words of
limitation superadded have been held sufficient in themselves to
make "issue" a word of purchase.25 Besides the presence of
(1874, Va.) 25 Grat. 70; Stokes v. Van Wyck (1887) 83 Va. 724, 3 S. E.
387. See also Powell v. Board of Domestic Missions, supra note 16; Tiraa-
nus v. Dugan, supra note 16; Ward -e. Jones (1S48) 40 N. C. 400; Gaddcrm
v. Desportes (1892) 39 S. C. 131, 17 S. E. 706.
23 Where both words of distribution and superadded words of limitation
appear, the result is, of course, clear. A good illustration of this type of
case is Powell v. Board of Domestic Missions, s2pra note 16. There the
devise was to A. for life, and "if he shall die leaving lawful issue, then
to the said issue, if one, to him or her, his or her heirs and assigns forever,
but if more than one, to be equally divided amongst them, their heirs and
assigns forever." Robins v. Quinliven, (1875) 79 Pa. 333 is a particularly
clear case; there was a devise to A. for life, and after her death "to her
issue and their heirs forever, in the proportions to which they would be
entitled under the intestacy laws of Pennsylvania, respectively, etc."
Other cases are Abbott v. Jenkins (1823, Pa.) 10 Serg. & R. 29G; Gourdn
r. Deas (1887) 27 S. C. 479, 4 S. E. 64. In the following cases there were
words of distribution alone: Hill v'. Gilces (1902) 201 Pa. 215, 50 AtL. 75;
Ward v. Jones, supra note 22.
21 In Kingsland v. Rapelye, srfpra note 22, there was a gift of realty to
a daughter for life, and then "to the lawful issue of my said daughter,
his, her and their heirs, executors, administrators and assig sz forcrcr,
equally to be divided among them, share and share alike." It was held
that the daughter took an estate tail, the court evidently misunderstand-
ing the English decisions. Grimnes v. Shirk, supra note 22, vas a case
of a remainder "to her lawful issue; to have and to hold the same fa
common to them, their heirs and assigns forcver." The court thought
that the words "in common" were not sufficient words of distribution.
Gardner v. Anderson, supra note 22, is a noteworthy recent eace. T.
gave the residue of his real and personal property to his daughter G.
for life, and then provided: "Should my daughter G. marry an] have
issue, then I direct that at her death my property shall descend to them
equally, share and share alike." On a bill to construe the will, it was
held that the daughter took a fee tail in the realty and an absolute
interest in the personalty. And this in spite of the fact that the statutes
provided that every conveyance of real estate should pass the entire
interest of the grantor unless restricted to a lesser estate (Kan. Gen. Sts.
1901, sec. 1202), and also provided for abrogation of the Rule in Shelley's
Case where the remainder was limited to the "heirs".
2z Shreve v. Shreve (1875) 43 Md. 382; Timnanus v. Dugan, s,.pra note,
16; MeIntyre v. McIntyre (1881) 16 S. C. 290; Boykin v. Ancrum (1887)
28 S. C. 486; Daniel v. Whartenby, supra note 16. Coafra: Gonzales v.
Barton, supra note 22; Zabriskic v. Wood, svpra note 22 (a five to four
decision); Wright v. Gaskill, supra note 22; Paxton v. Lefferts, cupra
note 7; Halls Ex'r r'. Smith, supra note 22; Stokes v. V.n Wyck, oupr
note 22.
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words of distribution and superadded words of limitation, there
is an indefinite number of other contexts which may induce a
court to adopt the purchase construction. Some of these have
occurred frequently enough to merit notice. In Shaw v. Weigh",
the English House of Lords decided that an estate tail was
created although the remainder was limited to the issue if the
life tenant died "leaving issue".27  In Wilkins v. Rowan2 - the
Nebraska court reached a different conclusion in a case where
there was similar language; but there were also the words "in
fee simple", and the primary ground for the decision is not
clear. In Pennsylvania it seems to be the rule that "leaving issue"
does not rebut the prima facie presumption of an estate tail, -9
although "leaving issue him surviving" does rebut it.30 Where a
remainder is limited to the issue of the life tenant who may be
"living at his death", it seems that the issue take as purchasers
and the Rule in Shelley's Case does not apply.31 Likewise, where
the remainder is conditioned upon the issue attaining a specified
age, the Rule does not apply.32 In Leightner v. Leightner" the
testator devised to two persons for their lives and after the death
of either to his issue. There was a further provision that the
interests given should be held in trust until the two life tenants
should attain the age of twenty-five, and that with the written
consent of the trustees either might "sell his interest . . . to
the other in fee simple." The court declared that this provision
would be meaningless if "issue" was construed as a word of
limitation, with the consequence of creating a fee tail which the
26 (1760, K.B. & H.L.) 2 Stra. 798.
27 Compare the English decisions holding that a gift over on death
"without leaving issue" refers to a general failure of issue in the case.
of land. Forth v. Chapman (1720, Ch.) 1 P. Wins. 663. The tendency
of the American decisions is to the contrary. Smith v. Kimbell (1894) 153
Ill. 368, 38 N. E. 1029.
28 (1921) 107 Neb. 180, 185 N. W. 437.
20Kleppner v. Laverty, supra note 22; and see Nes v. Ramsay, stipra
note 16. But see Hay v. Hay (1852, S. C.) 4 Rich. Eq. 478.
30 Nes v. Ramsay, supra. note 16. Compare Armstrong v. Michenr,
supra note 22. In that case there was a gift to the issue of the life
tenant, "if he shall so have, and if none then (over)". It was held that
an estate tail had been created.
31 Gadsden v. Desportes, supra note 22 (remainder after death of life
tenant to his male issue "then living"). And see Wistar v. Scott (1884)
105 Pa. 200; Hay v. Hay, supra note 29; Cushney v. Henry (1834, N. Y.)
4 Paige, 345. There is a suggestion in accord in Lethieullier v. Tracy
(1754, Ch.) 3 Atk. 784, at 796. Compare University of Oxford v. Clifton
(1759, Ch.) 1 Eden, 473, where a devise to "A and his issue living at his
death" was held to create an estate tail in A.
32 Helm v. Frisbie (1877) 59 Ind. 526; Way v. Gest (1825, Pa.) 14
Serg. & R. 40.
33 (1878) 87 Pa. 144.
TESTAMENTARY GIFTS TO "ISSUE"
statute would convert into a fee simple. In Shaltcrs v. Ladd'
the testator made a gift of land to H. and to "her heirs and
assigns", and further stipulated that at her death it should "be
enjoyed by the lawful issue of (H.), excepting that if F. B. S.
shall survive his wife (H.), he shall during his lifetime enjoy
the rents . . . of oize-third of the said estate." It was held
that H. took but a life estate, the decision being put upon the
ground that the testator had expressly excluded the husband's
curtesy and had given him an entirely different kind of interest,
thus indicating an intention not to create in H. an estate to which
curtesy would be incident; a fee tail in H. would be converted by
statute into a fee simple, and the husband would take curtesy. 5
The statutes which abrogate the Rule in Shelley's Case do not,
it is presumed, require the courts to hold "issue" to be a word
of purchase where it is clear that the testator intended it as one
of limitation. But it seems doubtful whether a court in a juris-
diction where such a statute exists will ever be satisfied as to
such intent on the part of the testator.2A Very little can b
said today in support of the rule of prima facie construction as a
word of limitation, particularly in view of the general abolition
of fees tail.
It remains to notice in connection with devises to issue the
case of Renbert v. Vctoe 7 The testator devised to M. A. R.
for life, and then "to such of her issue as she may lcae liviing",
the property to be "equally divided among such issue". Doubt-
less there was enough in this language to warrant the court in
interpreting the word "issue" as one of purchase. But the de-
cision was rested upon a somewhat different ground. It was
said that "issue" was a word of limitation equivalent to "heirs
of the body", but that no one could take as an heir of the body
unless he was an heir under the statute of descents as well as a
34 (1891) 141 Pa. 349, 21 Atl. 596.
- Compare Taylor v. Taylor (1870) 63 Pa. 481, where there was a
gift for life, with remainder to the issue of the life tenant if she should
die "leaving issue", and to their heirs and assigns; and a further provision
that if the life tenant should die without leaving issue, the estate should
be sold by the execetors after the death of the tcstator's wifc (who was a
co-devisee with the life tenant), and the proceeds divided among named
persons. The court said there was a remainder to the "children" of the
life tenant; but all that it was necessary to decide was that no estate
tail was created.
- See the following cases where the decision was based upon such a
statute: Barnett v. Banzett (1894) 104 Calif. 293, 37 Pac. 1049 (re-
mainder to the "issue and heirs of the body" of the life tenant); Williams
v. A zgell (1862) 7 R. I. 145 (remainder to the issue "in equal portions
and to their heirs and assigns forever"). See also Sopcr v. Brov:n, oulra
note 21, where the statute was not mentioned (words of distribution
present).
- (1911) 89 S. C. 198, 71 S. E. 959.
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lineal descendant. One is obliged to conclude that the court did
not mean what it said when it declared that issue was a word of
"limitation".
Where "issue" is used in a gift of personalty, it may be con-
strued as a word of limitation; and it has been said that such is
its prima facie meaning, even in that case. So, in Lyon v. Mit-
chell38 where the testator directed that a residue of personal es-
tate be divided equally among his sons "share and share alike,
as tenants in common, and to the issues of their several and
respective bodies", it was held that the sons took an absolute
interest in the residue.:" And the general rule that words which
in a devise of land would create an estate tail, in a bequest of
chattels give the absolute interest, has often received recogni-
tion in this country.40 But where a life estate in the personalty
is expressly limited, with a remainder to the issue, the tendency
of the cases both English and American is to construe "issue" as
a word of purchase. Thus, in Knight v. Ellis4 where the in-
come of a fund of money was left to T. B. for life, "and after
his decease . . . to the issue male of my said grandnephew
(T. B.)", it was held that the issue took as purchasers. 4- It is
to be noted that there wero no words of distribution applied to
the issue. That the decision represents a sound view as to the
proper interpretation of the word "issue" in such a gift is hardly
to be doubted. Personal property cannot be entailed; it is un-
likely that any testator would have intended "issue" under such
circumstances to be a word of limitation. Moreover, the Rule in
Shelley's Case does not apply to gifts of personalty as a rule of
law,4 3 so that there is sufficient freedom to attain the desired re-
38 (1816, Ch.) 1 Mad. 467.
39 Plumer, V. C., said: "It is a general rule that, whenever the Words
of a Will, used in a Bequest of Personal Property, would, if applied to
Real Property, give an Estate Tail, they pass an absolute Interest in
Personalty, unless the Testator shows a clear intention that they should
not be so construed. There can be no doubt that the words in this Will
would, if they had been applied to Real Property, have given an Estate
Tail to the four Sons. Is there then any apparent intention in this
Testator that the words of this Will should not have the effect of passing
absolute Interest to the Sons? . . . Prima facie the words give an
absolute Interest; and the onus lies upon the other side to show circum-
stances that lead to a different conclusion."
40 Woodley v. Findlay (1846) 9 Ala. 716; Ward v. Jones, supra, note 22.
4 Supra note 7.
42 Lord Chancellor Thurlow said: "It must have occurred to the judges
who have decided those cases, that, under the idea of making the rules
of decision as to leasehold estates analogous to those which are applied
to estates of inheritance, the intention of the testator must be much oftener
disappointed than carried into effect, and, then, there is no wonder that
the Court should try to get out of the technical rule by any means it can."
14 It is sometimes said that the Rule in Shelley's Case applies by anal-
ogy to gifts of personalty, but this seems to mean, more properly speak-
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sult even were the words "heirs of the body" used instead of the
supposedly non-technical word "issue". There are several deci-
sions in this country in which "issue" - and even "heirs of the
body" 5 have been construed as words of purchase in a bequest
of chattels. And in many cases the possibility of an estate tail,
or absolute interest, in the ancestor has not been considered.,
Some of this latter class of decisions may be influenced by the
fact that the Rule in Shelley's Case had been abolished in the
jurisdictions before the date of the cases. At least one court
has gone so far as to declare that in a will "issue" is prima facie
a word of purchaseY1 There are a few cases in which the court
ing, that the same result may be reached as a matter of construction of
intent. See 2 Jarman, op. cit. supra note 10, at 331-3; Theobald, op. cit.
supra note 11, at 477; Kales, Futzure Interests (1920) see. 434.
W Woodley v. Findlay, supra note 40 ("to the lawful issue of her body,
that may be then living, to them and each of them, share and share alil:e,
their heirs and assigns forever"); Myers v. Azdcroon (1847, S. C.) 1
Strobh. Eq. 344 ("to be the absolute property of the issue of their bodies
forever"); Hancock v. Butler (1858) 21 Tex. 804 ("to his lawful issue
forever").
- Prescott v. Prescott's Heirs (1849, Ky.) 10 1B. Mon. 56 ("to be equally
divided between the heirs lawfully begotten of her body"); Carltoa W.
Price, supra note 16, ("to the lawfully begotten heirs of his body", with
a provision for emancipation of the slaves which were the subject-matter
of the gift in the event of the death of the life tenant without an "heir").
For the peculiar and inconsistent results reached where "heir" or "heirz
of the body" are used in gifts of personalty, see Kales, op. cit. =pra note
43, at sees. 436-8.
4GEaton v. Eaton (1914) 88 Conn. 286, 91 Atl. 196; Middlctowa Teunt
Co. v. Gaffey (1921) 96 Conn. 61, 112 AtI. 689; Jackso v. Jacl:son (1891)
153 Mass. 374, 26 N. E. 1112; Palmer v. Ho-i (1881) 84 N. Y. 516;
Schmidt v. Jewett (1909) 195 N. Y. 486, 88 N. E. 1110; Mattcr of Lawrence
(1924) 238 N. Y. 116, 144 N. E. 361; Pearce v. Richard (1893) IS R. I. 142.
Some of the cases cited in note 49 in fra may also be of this class.
In Schmnidt v. Jewett, supra, the intention to give to the issue as pur-
chasers was peculiarly clear, for the gift was "to her legal issue in equal
portions after they severally reach the fudl age of twenty-one years." Note
a similar provision in Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, supra.
In Nice's Estate (1910) 227 Pa. 75, 75 Atl. 1025, there was a bequest
of personalty in a residuary clause which also carried realty. The lan-
guage was "to her issue, but should she die without issue, etc." One
ground of decision was that "die without issue" as applied to perzonalty
imported a definite failure of issue living at the death of the first donee,
and made "issue" a word of purchase. The contention that the construc-
tion should be governed by the rule applicable to devises because there
was a gift of the mixed residue was rejected.
4 Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, supra note 46. While the case in-
volved a gift of personalty, there was nothing to indicate that the court
intended its remark to be limited. It is doubtless an illustration of the
growing tendency to treat "issue" as a word of purchase whenever and
wherever possible. There seems to be an intimation to the same effect in
Hancock v. Butler, supra note 44.
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has failed to differentiate between realty and personalty with
respect to the effect of "issue" in the gift of a mixed residue.',
There is a large class of cases in which the testator has left
the benefit of a trust to "A" for life, and then directed that at
the death of "A" it be divided among "A's" issue. Usually it is
not possible to ascertain from the report of the case whether
the trust property consisted wholly of personalty, or of realty
and personalty mixed; and whether there was or was not a di-
rection to convert any realty which it may have comprised. Prac-
tically without exception "issue" has been construed in these
cases as a word of purchase, without discussion of the alterna-
tive.49 *It would seem that these decisions are right, without
respect to the question whether or not the Rule in Shelley's Case
had been abolished. As has already been pointed out, that Rule
can apply here only as a rule of construction. Regardless of the
make-up of the trust res, the testator does not, as a rule, think of
it as realty in any sense. Since he almost certainly con-
siders it as personalty, his language should be construed ac-
cordingly. Where the trust property consists entirely of realty,
the result should be governed, of course, by the principles prev-
iously discussed.
The full consequences of construing "issue" as a word of limi-
tation are well illustrated in Ledwith v. Hurst 0 There the trust
res consisted entirely of realty, which was to be kept intact for
several lives. If it should be decided that "issue" was intended
as a word of limitation, the result would be to create an estate
tail in Mary Ledwith, subject to the life interest of her mother
in one-half. This estate tail would be converted by the statute
into a fee simple.51 The gifts to charities which follow the de-
48 Gardner v. Anderson, supra note 22; Kingsland v. Rapelye, supra
note 22. But see Nice's Estate, supra note 46.
49 Stamford Trust Co. v. Lockwood (1922) 98 Conn. 337, 119 Atl. 218;
Stepheng v. Jodon (1923) 79 Ind. App. 596, 139 N. E. 293; King v. Savage
(1876) 121 Mass. 303; Dexter v. Inches (1888) 147 Mass. 324, 17 N. .
551; Matter of Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. (1914) 213 N. Y. 168, 107
N. E. 340; In re Lawrence's Estate (1920, Surro. Ct. N. Y. Co.) 111 Misc,
524, 181 N. Y. Supp. 498; Matter of Durant (1921) 231 N. Y. 41, 131
N. E. 562 (for report of this case in the Appellate Division, see (1920, 1t
Dept.) 193 App. Div. 80, 183 N. Y. Supp. 339). Doubtless some of the
above cases could be brought within the rule applied in connection with
gifts of realty, because of the presence of words of distribution. So, Dex-
ter v. Inches, In re Lawrence's Estate, and Matter of Durant.
Frequently the trust cases contain a direction that the trustee shall
"divide among" or "distribute among" the issue. This would sufficiently
indicate the intention to make "issue" a word of purchase; but a more
directionto "pay to" or to "turn over to" or to "transfer to" would not
seem enough, as no division is necessarily indicated by such language.
io The facts are fully stated supra note 1.
-' Pa. Sts. 1920, secs. 8323, 10256.
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vise to the issue would doubtless fail, then, being non-vested limi-
tations on a general default of issue.
But apparently the court did not in this case adopt the "limita-
tion" construction. Nor would such an interpretation be per-
missible in the face of the fact that the limitation was to the
issue "for and during the ternz of their natural lives". Such a
restriction upon the quantum of the estate granted clearly indi-
cated that the testator had in mind descendants or issue of Mlary
living at a particular time. In White v. Collnzs52 the testator gave
lands to his son, F. M., and then "to the heir male of his body
lawfully begotten, during the term of his natural life", and for
want of such heir, to his daughters. It was held that F. .1. did
not take a fee tail; the words "heir male of the body" were words
of purchase descriptive of the person to take in remainder. The
court considered the question as settled by Archce's Ca-e.c- So
also in Pedder v. Hun t,- where the testator gave land to his
eldest son for life, and declared that it should thereafter be en-
joyed by "the oldest surviving heir of my oldest surviving son
then living for their life or lives forever". The court denied the
contention that Thomas, who was the oldest surviving son of the
testator, took an estate tail, because the limitation to the "heir"
was for life only."
Second Constructionz: "Issue" in a Will May Combi-e the Idea
of Liniitation with That of Pzirchase, Creating in the Pcrson
First Answering the Description "Heir of the Body" an Estate
Tail in Realty, a2d an Absolute Interest in Personalty. There
are some instances in which the same words serve the double
purpose of pointing out purchasers and at the same time delimit-
ing the quantum of the estate given. So, where there is a gift
to the "heirs of A", or to the "heirs of the body of A", without
any gift of a life estate to A himself, a fee simple or fee tail,
as the case may be, is created in the person first answering the
description "heir' or "heir of the body".r' Similarly, a gift
to "issue" without any estate in the ancestor preceding, might
be held to pass a fee tail in realty, or an absolute interest in
personalty, to the person first answering the description "heir
of the body". But the decisions in England are against such a
5:2 (1719, C. P.) Comyns, 289.
53 (1597, C. P.) 1 Co. "66b.
54 (1887) 18 Q. B. D. 565.
z5 It would appear that the principle of these cases fairly covers Lcd-
with v. Hvrst, supra note 1. There was also an additional factor in that
case which may be thought to have a bearing in this connection. The
issue were to take "per stirpes". This shows that the testator contemplated
the possibility of different generations of issue taking concurrently. This
would not happen, probably, if "issue" be taken as a word of limitation
equivalent to "heirs of the body".
z6 Leake, op. cit. supra note 3, at 121; 2 Jarman, op. cit. -upra note 10,
at 69.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
construction. In Freeman v. Parsley57 a testator gave personalty
to E. R., in case of her death "to be equally divided between her
lawful issue, share and share alike". E. R. predeceased the
testator. There survived the testator two children of E. R.,
children of a deceased child, and children of a living child. It
was held that the children and grandchildren of E. R. all took
per capita. In Cook v. Cook 8 the testator devised to "the issue
of J. S." It was held that all issue living at the death of the
testator took, but took only life estates. The American cases are
to the same effect.'9 There seems to be, therefore, no authority
for making the word "issue" combine in itself the ideas of pur-
chase and limitation. Moreover, so far as the writer knows, it
has never been held-that any word or words combined these ideas
where a life estate to the ancestor preceded. In such a situation,
if the idea of limitation was thought to be contained in "issue",
the word was construed exclusively as one of limitation, creating
the estate tail in the ancestor.6"
Third Construction: "Issue" in a Will May Include the Whole
Line of Descent and Give Life Estates Successively to the Heirs
of the Body for the Time Being. Strange as such a proposition
may seem, it would appear that this was actually the idea of the
Pennsylvania court in Ledwith v. Hurst.6 ' In Pedder v. Hunt,
supra,6 2 the court thought it the intention of the testator to create
a series of life estates, each vesting in the heir for the tine being
57 (1797, Oh.) 3 Ves. 421.
58 (1706, Ch.) 2 Vern. 545.
'9 In the following American cases there was a gift to the issue without
any preceding gift to the ancestor, and it was not suggested that the word
could be construed otherwise than as one of purchase: Union Safe Deposit
and Trust Co. v. Dudley (1908) 104 Me. 297, 72 At. 166; Hills v. Barnard
(1890) 152 Mass. 67, 25 N. E. 96; Green v. Hussey (1917) 228 Mass. 537,
117 N. E. 798; Ernst v. Rivers (1919) 233 Mass. 9, 123 N. E. 93; Gardiner
v. Everett (1922) 240 Mass. 536, 134 N. E. 372; Petry v. Petry (1919, 1st
Dept.) 186 App. Div. 738, 175 N. Y. Supp. 30, aff'd 227 N. Y. 621,
125 N. E. 924. The above were all cases of gifts in trust, the exact com-
position of the trust res not appearing. See discussion of the trust cases
in the text, supra.
In Wistar v. Scott, supra note 31, the testator gave a lot to his daughters
for life, and then to "the male issue, then living, of my son R., their or
his heirs and assigns in fee." The court declared that although "issue"
was primarily a word of limitation, the context here showed it to be one of
purchase. Stress was put upon the words "then living". There was no
suggestion that an estate tail might have been created in the issue of R.
living at the death of the daughters.
Go Even if the will in Ledwith v. Hurst, supra, had been construed as
creating an estate tail in the issue of Mary living at her death, the only
effect would have been to give such issue a fee simple under the statute
previously referred to, and to leave no r6om for the application of the
Rule .against Perpetuities so far as the issue were concerned.
61 Supra note 1.
62 Supra note 54.
TESTAMENTARY GIFTS TO "ISSUE"
of the eldest surviving son of the testator. Perhaps the language
employed in that will warranted the inference. In Parfitt e.
Hembe- 3 the limitation was "to my said nephews and niece, and
the survivors of them, and to the issue and issues of them re-
spectively for their respective lives forever. . . ." Romilly,
M. R., thought that the intention shown was to make a series of
life estates in perpetuity to the issue. In Hampton v. Holmei
the testator gave the benefit of a trust fund to his daughter for
life, and directed that if she left children surviving her, the
trustees should apply the income of the fund to the support and
maintenance of such children equally, "during the term of their
natural lives, and in like manner to their children and children's
children. . . ." While the court did not directly decide the
question, it was clearly of the opinion that no series of life
estates was contemplated. Allyn z,. Mather5 was a case of a tes-
tamentary provision that after the death of the first life tenant
the land should be equally divided between two grandsons of
the testator "during their natural lives, and after their decease,
to each of the eldest sons, lawfully begotten, and so from eldest
son or sons forever; and in case they should have none, to the
eldest male child of any of my three sons; and so from eldest to
eldest to the end of time". The court held that the testator had
attempted to create a series of life estatescO
In all of the cases where the intention to create such a series
of life estates has been found to eist, and also in Hampton v.
Homan, where the court decided against such an inference, the
language has pointed much more clearly in that direction than
in Ledwith v. Hurst. In the latter case the testator limited the
property to the issue and "the survivor of such issue". He would
not have used the word "survivor" unless he had reference to a
class of lives existing concurrently. We do not speak of a grand-
child born after the death of his grandfather as "surviving"
him. The provision for per stirpes distribution among the issue
also looks toward a single class and not toward a series of es-
tates. Finally, the provision for sale at the death of the sur-
vivor and distribution to the charities, would seem to complete
the case against the Pennsylvania court's apparent position. The
testator directed distribution among four specific charities, doubt-
less selecting them because of his familiarity with, and his interest
in, their work. Would he knowingly have made them a gift the
benefit of which they might never realize because of the con-
tinuance to the end of time of this series of life estates? If he
63 (1867, Ch.) L. R. 4 Eq. Cas. 443.
04 (1876) L. R. 5 Ch. D. 183.
65 (1832) 9 Conn. 114.
66 For a discussion of the possibilities of cy pres in such cases, cee Gray,
Rule against Perpetuitles (3d ed. 1915) sec. 652.
585
YALE LAW JOURNAL
intended such a series, he must have supposed that it could be
validly limited. Certainly such a construction should not be put
upon his language in a doubtful case, where the effect of it is to
defeat in large measure his entire purpose.
If it be determined in a given case that there is the intention
to create such a series of life estates as has been referred to, then
no doubt a remainder limited in fee thereafter will be void for re-
moteness under the rule of In re Mortimer. In that case there
was a gift to an unborn child for life, a remainder in fee tail to
the eldest son of that child, and (after intermediate limitations)
a remainder in fee simple to the heirs of F. G., a person living at
the death! of the testator. It is clear that the ultimate remainder
to the heirs of F. G. would have vested at the latter's death, and so
have escaped the operation of the Rule against Perpetuities un-
less the fact that it followed an invalid limitation in tail affected
the vesting. It was held to be void.""
Fourth Construction: "Issue" in a Will May Mean "Children"
of the Ancestor Referred to. If the word "issue" be construed
as one of purchase, describing a class of persons who are to take
immediately upon the death of a life tenant who is living at the
death of the testator, all persons comprised within that class take
vested interests not later than the death of the said life tenant, and
so the gift to the class is valid as far as the Rule against Perpetui-
ties is concerned. And if the issue take only life estates, no
reason is perceived why a remainder limited thereafter to chari-
ties may not be regarded as a vested remainder, also perfectly
valid. The mere fact that the life estates may last for more than
lives in being and twenty-one years after the death of the testa-
tor does not invalidate a remainder limited after them.6 ' But
it remains to inquire who the purchasers are that are included
67 (1905) L. R. 2 Ch. D. 502.
68 Under the rule stated the gift to charities in Ledwith v. Hurst, supra
note 1, was clearly bad if the court was correct in its apparent construc-
tion of the will as creating a series of life estates.
It is interesting to note Professor Gray's change of position in respect
to the vested or non-vested character of a remainder limited after such a
series. See Gray, op. cit. supra note 66, at sec. 251. It is not clear why
the invalid life estates may not be disregarded entirely, with the conse-
quential elimination of the condition precedent which deprives the re-
mainder of its otherwise vested character.
Strangely enough, the Pennsylvania court itself seems to have denied
in a dictum the conclusion reached in Ledwith v. Hurst as to the failure
of the gift to the charities. In In re Bingaman's Estate (1924) 281 Pa.
497, 127 Atl. 173, the court said: "It is contended that . . . the gift
in remainder to the hospital fell with the void particular estate . ..
This, however, is an erroneous conclusion . . . the gift to the hospital
would be good, no matter what happens to the life estates, for that gift
was vested, and was bound to go to the hospital at some future time."
(Italics are the writer's).
69 Gray, op. cit. supra note 66, at sec. 209.
586
TESTAMENTARY GIFTS TO "ISSUE"
within the class, whether the "issue" are the children only of
the ancestor referred to, or the grandchildren and more remote
descendants as well who may be living at his death.
That "issue" may mean "children" and "children" only, is en-
tirely clear. In Palmer v. Horn-0 the testator gave a sum of money
to be divided "into as many shares as there shall be lawful issue
of my deceased nephew, Matthew Horn, living at my death, and
to invest and apply the income from each of the said shares to
the use of each of the said children, respectively, etc." It was
properly held that "issue" meant children, as it was clear that
the testator had used the two words synonymously. And in
Craig v. Warner '- a devise was made to J. E. C. for life, "and
if the said J. E. C. shall . . . die leaving lawful isaue, or
lawful descendants of such children, . . then I give to such
issue, etc." Here again it was held that "issue" was equivalent
to "children". Where a testatrix gave to her husband for life,
and then to "my children, issue of my said husband and myself
him surviving", the court decided that the meaning of "children"
was not enlarged by use of the word "issue". 2 And in a number
of other cases the court was more or less justified in construing
"issue" to mean "children" upon the ground that the testator had
used the words "issue" and "child" synonmously.- It has even
been held that the use interchangeably of the words mentioned in
another and entirely distinct gift in the same will warrants the
construction as meaning "children". 74
A strong tendency is manifested in the English decisions to
hold that the use of such words as "parent", "father", or "mother"
correlatively with "issue" limits the meaning of the latter to "chil-
dren". The leading case on this point is Sibley '. Perry,-2 de-
cided by Lord Eldon in 1802. There the testator had given two
legacies substantially in this form: "I give and bequeath to
John . . . £1000 stock as aforesaid if living at the time of
my death, and to his lawful issue, share and share alike if the
parent should then be dead." He afso gave other gifts in this
form: "I give to each of the lawful issue . . . of T. D.
£130 stock as aforesaid if living at my decease". The
70Supra note 46.
71 (1887, D.C.) 5 Mackey, 460. A similar construction of the same xill
was adopted in Craig v. Rowland (1897) 10 D. C. App. 402.
72 Greenfield v. Lauritson (1923) 306 Ill. 279, 137 N. E. 818.
73Stisser v. Stisser (1908) 235 Ill. 207, 85 N. E. 240; Faison v. Odi
(1907) 144 N. C. 107, 56 S. E. 793; Walker v,. Milligan (1863) 45 Pa. 178;
Parkhurst v. Harrower (1891) 142 Pa. 432, 21 Atl. 826. In Wcclawken
Ferry Co. v. Sisson, supra note 7, a grantor conveyed land to his con and
to "such other lawful issue" as might be living. Held that there wvas
nothing in this context to restrict "issue" to "children".
'4 Middletour Trust Co. v. Gaffey, supra note 46.
- (1802, Ch.) 7 Ves. Jr. 523.
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question' was who should take under the name "issue" in a gift
of the latter sort. It was declared that "issue" meant "chil-
dren", the court reaching this conclusion from the use of the
word "parent" in the gifts of the former type. Later decisions
have established this rule in England.7 r But it has been subjected
to vigorous criticism. In Ralph v. Carrick7 there was a gift to
the children of Mrs. W., "the descendants, if any, of those who
might have died being entitled to the benefit which their deceased
parent would have received had he or she been then alive." There
was a gift over if there should be no children or descendants.
The court held that "descendants" did not mean "children".
James, L. J., said: "I am not sure that some of the consequences
of such a rule [i. e., that "issue" means "children"] have always
received the attention they ought to have received. Suppose a
man to leave his property to his wife for life, and at her death
to all his children then living and the issue of such of them as
should be then dead, equally to be divided between them, the
issue of any of them who might be then dead to take only their
parent's share. Suppose then his children all to die before the
period of division, having had children who predeceased them
leaving families4 The grandchildren might go to the workhouse,
and the family property go to a stranger under the residuary gift.
That seems a possible result of that rule".7 8  The court then
decided that Sibley v. Perry did not govern because there the
word construed was "issue", while here the word was "descend-
ants", a word not so easily confined to "children" by the context."
It was further remarked that even though "issue" had been the
word used, Sibley v. Perry would not have applied because the
case at bar was indistinguishable from Ross v. Ross. 0
The last mentioned case undoubtedly narrowed materially the
76 Pruen v. Osborne (1840, Ch.) 11 Simons, 132; Martin v. Holqate (1866)
L. R. 1 H. L. 175.
77 Supra note 21.
78 In the same case Brett, L. J., said: "I think, after the way in which
Sibley v. Perry has been spoken of in subsequent decisions, we are not at
liberty to say that it does not lay down a general rule. But I think the
fate of that general rule will be the fate which usually accompanies a
rule which is not liked, namely, that it will be applied to cases exactly
like Sibley v. Perry, and to no others; or, in other words, it will be no
general rule at all, and, after hearing what the effect of such a general
rule may be as described by Lord Justice James, I should have no objec-
tion to be present at the funeral of Sibley v. Perry."
79 James, L. J., said: "Now the word 'issue' is an ambiguous word.
. . . . But in this case there is what appears to me a perfectly unam-
biguous word-descendants-a word which I venture to say no layman
or lawyer would use to designate children only. Descendants means chil-
dren and their children and their children to any degree, and it is difficult
to conceive any context by which the word 'descendants' could be limited
to mean children only."
80 (1855, Oh.) 20 Beav. 645.
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rule of Sibley v. Perry. The case presented for the consideration
of the court was a gift of personalty in trust for C. R. for life,
and after her decease on trust to transfer the same to "all and
every the child and children of the said C. R. who shall be living
at the time of her decease, and of the issue, if any, then living,
of such of her children as may have died in her lifetime, each of
her surviving children to take an equal share, and the issue, if
more than one, of such of her children as may have died in her
lifetime to take equally amongst them the part or share which
their parent would have been entitled to, if he or she had sur-
vived the said C. R., azd ff but one, then to take a child's share."
There was a gift over if C. R. should die without leaving a child
or issue of a child. The court was of the opinion that "issue"
was not limited in meaning to "children". Its conclusion was
based principally upon the gift over in default of issue, in which
there was nothing to limit the meaning of "issue". It was thought
that the testator could not have intended an intestacy while there
was issue of C. R. living, a result which might follow if the word
"issue" was given a narrower significance in the gift to issue
than in the gift over. On the other hand, if the scope of the word
in the default clause was limited to "children", the effect might
be to defeat a grandchild of C. R. and give the property over.
This it was thought the testator could not have intended.8, Thus,
while Ross v. Ross merely limited the rule of Sibley v. Pcry to
cases where it was clear that the word "parent" was used strictly,
and referred to the first taker,82 it is apparent that the court was
not in sympathy with the latter case' 3
In this country the rule of Sibley v,. Perry has received some
direct support. A comparatively recent case in New Jersey,-
81 In Ralph v. Carrick, supra note 21, also, much emphasis was put upon
the default clause without anything in it to limit the meaning of "issue".
James, L. J., said: "It is one of the most settled, and appears to me one
of the most reasonable rules of construction, that where there is a gift
over on the failure of certain persons the previous gift must, if the words
reasonably admit of it, be construed as a gift to the same persons. Here
it is beyond all question that the gift over is only to take effect upon an
absolute failure of the descendants of all the aunts. There is nothing
whatever to limit the words, and we are bound, unless there is something
which absolutely compels us to the contrary, to suppose that the original
gift was to the persons on failure of whom the gift over was to take
effect."
82 Romilly, Al. R., said: "It is clear that the 'issue' of the 'parent' must
mean the 'children' of the 'parent', but it is not certain, in every case (and
it must be so before that rule can apply), that the testator has, by the
word 'parent', meant to signify the first taker, the child in the first in-
stance . . . it [word "parent"] might mean the child of the parent
who would have been entitled, if that parent had survived C. IL, that is
to say, if one of the children had died leaving a child who had died leav-
ing other children."
83 Compare also In 1re Orton's Tirusts (1866) L. R. 3 Eq. Cas. 375.
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Coyle v. Coyle, 4 -squarely sanctions it. But the case was based
almost solely upon the English precedents, and evidently did not
command the whole-hearted approval of the court. King v.
Savage" was cited as an American precedent. An examination
of that case will show that the court was not called upon to de-
cide that "issue" meant children; it would have been enough to
hold that the issue took per stirpes, and, therefore, that no chil-
dren of living issue could participate. Moreover, it is clear from
the later Massachusetts cases that the rule in that jurisdiction is
now, at least, settled to the contrary. 0  Taylor v. Taylor,"T a
Pennsylvania case, is an authority for the English construction,
by way of dictum only. There the testator gave to his daughter.
S. B., for life, and after her death to her lawful issue, and fur-
ther provided, "in case my daughter shall depart this life . . .
leaving lawful issue, such issue shall inherit their mother's right
from the time of her death." The court said: "No declaration
could well be more express to show that by issue he meant chil-
dren; for they were to inherit and enjoy 'their mother's right'
from the time of her death." But all that the court had before
it was the question whether a purchaser from S. B. had received
a clear title under a conveyance intended to bar the supposed en-
tail. Two other Pennsylvania cases likewise seem to be but
dicta.88 Austin v. Bristol has been cited as standing for the
English rule.90 But it is not at all certain that the case decided
that point. The testator had given the residue of his estate to
his wife for life, and at her death to "such of my children as
may be living at the time of her decease, and to the issue of those
who may have deceased, and to their heirs and assigns forever,
to be equally divided between them; the issue of such deceased
children to take per stirpes and not per capita." The testator
had five children, one of whom predeceased him, leaving a child
who survived the testator but died in the lifetime of the widow.
It was held that although the gift to the children of the testator
was contingent upon their surviving the life tenant, the gift to
the issue vested immediately upon the death of the testator, so
that the administrator of the deceased grandchild was entitled
to her share. As there was nothing to divest a remainder once it
vested, the practical result in the particular situation may have
been to confine the gift to the child of the testator's deceased child.
But suppose that at the death of the testator this grandchild had
84 (1907) 73 N. J. Eq. 528, 68 AtI. 224.
85 Supra note 49.
86 See Massachusetts cases cited infra note 93.
87 Supra, note 35.
88 O'Rourke v. Sherwin (1893) 156 Pa. 285, 27 AtI. 43; Nice's Estate,
supra note 46.
89 (1873) 40 Conn. 120.
0 Kales, op. cit. supra note 43.
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herself been dead, leaving a child surviving. Such surviving
child would have been the greatgrandchild of the testator, and
the grandchild of the testator's child. Would not such great-
grandchild of the testator have been held entitled to a share in
the property? It is true that the Connecticut court relied upon
the English authorities0 ' holding that in such case the remainder
to the issue was not contingent upon their surviving the life
tenant, and that these English authorities did unquestionably re-
gard "issue" in such cases as were before them to be the equiva-
lent of "children"; but it does not seem that the Connecticut case
can be fairly considered as an authority for the proposition that
"issue" was restricted to "children", however much one may feel
disposed to question the propriety of the decision as to the vested
character of the remainder. It should be noted, moreover, that
there was no correlative word such as "parent" present in this
case. In a few other cases the English rule has been stated as
one of several grounds for the decision, or has been approved in
a dictumY2-
Against the above authorities are several clear-cut cases to
the effect that "issue" is not restricted to "children" by the use
of "parent" or equivalent words in connection with it..Y3 That the
meaning of "issue" is not limited to "children" in the absence of
such correlatives as referred to, is generally admitted.0,
Fifth Construction: "Issue" in a Will May Include All De-
scendants Living at the Time of Distribution. Having rejected
the proposition that "issue" means "children", except in the case
of a very special context, we would seem to come naturally to the
conclusion that it includes descendants of all degrees living at
the time of distribution. And this is, indeed, a very generally
accepted rule.'5  It is, however, subject to some qualification, in
many jurisdictions, as will be pointed out in more detail under
the next head.
Skvth Construction: "Issue" in a Will May Izelude Onlly Such
91 Martin v. Holgate, saupra note 76.
92 Wallace v. Wallace (1925, Conn.) 130 AtI. 116; Ganmnell v. Erinct
(1895) 19 R. I. 292, 33 AtI. 222; Arnold v. Aldcn (1895) 173 IMI. 229, 50
N. E. 704. And see also Chwatal v. Schrcincr (1896) 148 N. Y. 6S3, 43
N. E. 166.
93 Dexter v. Inches, supra note 49; Hills v,. Barnard, supra note 59; Jack-
son v. Jackson, supra note 46; Trust Co. v. Dud!ej, supra, note 59; Mut-
ter of Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., supra note 49.
24 Fraeman v. Parsley, supra note 57; Stamford Trust Co. -,. Lockwood,
supra, note 49; Yarrington v. Freeman, (1923) 201 Ky. 135, 255 S. W. 1034;
Trust Co. v. Dudley, supra note 59; Gardincr v. Ercrett, supra note 59;
Wilk-ins v. Rowan, supra note 28; Soper v. Brown, supra- note 21; Petry v.
Petry, supra note 59; Mattcr~oDn-ranzt, supra note 49; Wcchawhc. Fcrry
Co. v. Sisson, supra note 7; Wistar v. Scott, supra note 31; Rhode kla.d
Hospital Trust Co. v. Bridghzam, sulpra note 15; Ridicy v. McPmcr on (1897)
100 Tenn. 402, 43 S. W. 772.
-z All of the cases cited in the preceding note may be deemed to stand
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Descendants Living at the Time of Distribution as Can Be Con-
prehended in a Per Stirpes Distribution. Where there are issue
of different generations living at the time of distribution, many
courts are disposed to hold that they take per stirpes-i. e., it is
more consonant with the court's idea of fairness that they should
take in that manner. This feeling is particularly strong where
there are children of living descendants who would be included
in a per capita distribution equally with their parents. Suppose
there are two descendants of the first generation, one of whom
has ten living children, who are, of course, themselves issue. If
there is a per capita distribution, the property will be divided
into twelve shares, eleven of which will go to one family, regard-
ing each stirps and his issue as a "family". This result gives
the impression of unfairness as between the two descendants of
the first generation, and also as between the one descendant and
his children, he taking but a single share, while they together
take ten shares, though more remote from the ancestor. Many
courts have struggled hard to avoid such a result. Of course,
the question is one of the testator's intention; if he desired such
a distribution, it must be had, unfair though it may be. Doubt-
less the truth of the matter is that usually the testator has never
thought about such a possible situation. He thinks of the issue
as a class without fixing his mind upon the individual members
thereof; he looks only at the center of the picture, so to speak,
seeing only the indubitable portion, and not that part which shades
off into the background. In the occasional case where he has
thought about the problem, he indicates his meaning more or
less clearly; and the court eagerly lays hold of the slightest in-
dication of intention. But what is to be done in the case where
there is nothing which can be tortured into an expression of de-
sire upon this point of per capita or per stirpes taking? The
court must decide upon one or the other. Since by hypothesis
"issue" includes descendants of all degrees, it is difficult to adopt
a mode of distribution which may eliminate some of them, as
where there are children of living issue, although admitting others
equally remote whose parent is dead. Where there is absolutely
nothing which can be construed as a manifestation of the inten-
tion to have a per stirpes distribution, the authorities generally
hold that it must be per capita,6 even though as a result
children of living issue will take with their parents.01
for this proposition, subject to the qualifications discussed in the follow-
ing section.
90 Freeman v. Parsley, supra note 57; Yarrington v. Freeman, supra
note 94; Price v. Sisson and Weehawken Ferry Co. v. Sisson, supra note 7;
Soper v. Brown,, supra note 21; Schmidt v. Jewett, supra note 46; Petry
v. Petry, supra note 59; Wistar v. Scott, supra note 31; Pearce V. Rickard,
supra note 46; Ridley v. McPherson, supra note 94.
97Freeman v. Parsley, supra; Price v. Sisson, supra; Petry v. Petry,
supra; Pearce .Rickard, supra; Ridley v. McPherson, supra.
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It may be instructive to examine a few typical cases to see
what courts have regarded as sufficient indication of an intention
to have a per stirpes distribution. First is that class of cases
where the word "parent" or some equivalent expression is used
in connection with the word "issue". While, as we have seen,
this correlation of the two words is not always sufficient in this
country to induce the construction of "issue" as meaning "chil-
dxen", it might be thought that it shows a desire on the part of
the testator to have a per stirpes distribution. By declaring that
the "issue" shall take the "parent's" share, the testator may mean
that when any persoa who would take as "issue" if he survived
the period of distribution dies, his descendants shall take the
share he would have been entitled to had he survived. 3 This view
was strongly endorsed by the late Mr. Kales, who said: "The very
fact that 'parent' does not turn issue into children means that
'parent' does not refer to the members of the original class who
are to take and those alone, but refers to whoever may be
a parent of any issue. The word 'parent' is thus used in a re-
curring or sliding sense so as to apply to successive generations
of issue. When 'parent' is used in this sense, of course, the dis-
tribution can only be among those descendants who have no an-
cestors living and who stand in the place of their ancestors de-
ceased." 91 Mr. Willard Brooks has replied to this suggestion
in the following words: "It is perhaps conceivable that when
a testator says 'such issue to take the parent's share', he had in
mind many groups, each group being the issue of any member
of the original 'issue', each of these sub-groups, therefore, taking
its immediate ancestor's share. But whether conceivable or not,
such an inference is, to say the least, highly improbable. As a
fiction, if it were a good one, we might still adopt it; but the
limits of common-sense should not be stretched to such an extent as
to imagine that the testator actually intended this 'recurring or
sliding sense'. Can there be any real question but that when he
speaks of 'such issue' and the 'parent' of the same, he means a
single ancestor?" 11o It must be conceded that there is much force
in this answer. In cases like Ross v. Ross, supra, where the con-
text has deterred the court from holding that "parent" makes
98 In Ross v. Ross, supra note 80, Romilly, M. R., said: "The whole
thing is set right . . . if you refer the word 'parent' there to such
one of the children of the children of C. R., that is, to the grandchildren
of C. R., who, if that parent had lived, would have taken the share which
the child of C. R., if that child had lived, would have taken, that is to
say, it carries on the distribution per stirpcs, not merely through the first
degree, but extending it even to the second."
9' Kales, op. cit. supra note 43, at sec. 580; and see also, Theobald, op.
cit. supra note 11, at 319.
1o Brooks, Meaning of the Word "Issztc" in Gifts to "Issuc--A othe •
View (1911) 6 ILL. L. Rnv. 230, 232.
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"issue" mean "children", the English judges have attributed to
the testator the intention to have a per stirpes distribution. So
in that case, where there survived the life tenant, to whose "is-
sue" the gift was made, three children, the children of a deceased
child, and a grandchild of a fifth child, also deceased, it was held
that the grandchild was entitled to one-fifth of the property, that
being the share to which his grandparent would have been en-
titled had he survived. And there are several decisions in this
country attaching like importance to the use of the word
,,parent".10
There have been a few cases in which it would seem that the
testator has indicated his intention beyond doubt in favor of a
per stirpes distribution. In Robins v. Quinliven'02 the gift to
the issue was declared to be "in the proportion to which they
would be entitled under the intestacy laws of Pennsylvania." If,
as is usually the case, the statute of descents and distributions pro-
vides that heirs of unequal degree shall take per stirpes, there
can be no doubt as to the correct result in such a case. So, also,
in Green v. Hussey,'03 where the testator gave to the lineal de-
9cendants of G. H., and then provided "If all the lineal descend-
ants aforesaid then living are in the same degree of kindred to
the said G. H.,, they shall share the estate equally and shall be
paid in equal shares; otherwise they shall take according to right
of representation." G. H. had eleven children, forty-five grand-
children and numerous greatgrandchildren. At the time for dis-
tribution three grandchildren and many greatgrandchildren sur-
vived. It was properly held that the property must be divided
into forty-five shares. Likewise there should be a per stirpes
distribution where the will provides for a gift "in equal shares
to the then living children or lineal descendants by right of repre-
sentation of my six brothers, etc." 104 Now it should be noted
that Ledwith v. Hurst is a case of this type, for the testator ex-
pressly declared that division among the issue should be "per
stirpes". 105 Cushney v. Henry'0 was a somewhat peculiar case.
The testatrix provided that on the death of the survivor of her
three children a trust estate should be sold, and the proceeds
divided among the "issue" of those children. If all of the said
children left issue, one-third part of the proceeds was to be paid
to the issue of each; if but two left issue, one-half to the issue of
101 See cases cited supra note 93.
102 Supra note 23.
103 Supra note 59.
104 In re Dalrymple's Will (1921) 173 Wis. 464, 180 N. W. 829.
105 In Gourdin v. Deas, supra note 23, there was a deed to the issue to
take "per stirpes". It was held that the gift vested in the issue of the
first generation living at the date of the deed, and the descendants of
those deceased.
1O'Supra note 59.
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each; and if but one left issue, that issue to take the whole. The
issue were always to take as tenants in common. And then it
was further provided that if any child of the sons or daughter
of the testatrx should have died in the lifetime of its parcnt,
leaving issue, which issue should be living at the death of the
survivor of the children of the testatrx, then such issue should
stand in the place of and take such part of the estate as his, her
or their paretit would have been entitled to if living. It was held
that there should be per stirpes distribution even though all the
surviving issue were greatgrandchildren of the testatrix. It
would seem in this case that the testatrLx expressly provided for
per stirpes distribution only as to the fast generation of issue;
the decision carried it into the second generation. Yet this would
seem a proper result, for it is evident that the testatrix had such
a manner of divisibn in mind and expressed her desire with re-
spect to the concrete situation she thought would likely arise;
there is every reason to suppose that she would have desired a
similar result in the circumstances as they actually developed.
There is a large class of cases where the court has professed
to see the intention for a per stirpes distribution, but where the
evidence of such intention is very slight, indeed. In Stamford
Trust Co. v. Lockwood '1 7 the testator gave to the "lawful issue"
of two grandchildren, and then provided that if both should die
without issue surviving, he gave to the "issue" of three of his
children, "per stirpes". From the use of these words in the
gift over the court inferred the intention to have a per stirpes
division among the issue of the first donees. In Rcmnbc;rt v.
Vetoe'10 there was a gift for life, with remainder to the "issue".
Then followed a gift over on death without issue to the next of
kin of the testator "according to the statute of distribution of in-
testate estates". It was held that division among the issue of the
first donee should be per stirpes, so as to exclude children of
living issue. Perhaps one would not be disposed to criticise
severely the result in these two cases; there was evidence which
may have justified the inferences drawn.
There are a number of decisions in New York which show how
far a court is willing to go in the indulgence of its preference for
a per stirpes distribution, and yet feel the necessity for justifying
its action on the ground of an alleged intention of the testator.
In Matter 6f Farmers' Loan azd Trust Co.CO9 there was a gift
to F. 21. for life, and then to his "issue", with a gift over in
event of no issue. F. 11. died leaving two daughters and four
grandchildren who were the children of these daughters. The
court found an intention to give to the issue per stirpes because
lo7Supra note 49.
108 Supra note 37.
109Supra note 49.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
in another clause of the will the testator had provided that if any
of his children should die before division of his estate, then he
gave the share of such children to their "issue", to take equally
"what would have been the parent's shares". In re Lawrence's
Estate" was the case of a gift to the issue of C. L. M., but "if
she shall die without leaving lawful issue, then her share shall go
to increase the shares of my other children and their legal repre-
sentatives." The court here found a "faint glimpse" of intent to
give per stirpes, in the reference to "legal representatives" in the
gift over. In Matter of Durant"' a gift was given in trust for
a daughter for life and then to her "issue". The testator had
given legacies to his sons absolutely, but with the provision that
if they should die before him without leaving issue, then the pro-
perty should go to others. Now under the New York statute a
legacy did not lapse if the legatee left issue; therefore the court
inferred from the fact that there was E gift over if the legatee
did noA leave issue that the testator had the statute in mind, and
intended a distribution among the issue per stirpes in all caseg.
Occasionally a testator makes a gift to "the children of A and
the issue of any deceased child", associating the issue in the
same gift with persons of equal degree to the ancestor. A recent
case of this type is Matte of Lawrence,"'2 where property was
directed to be divided on the death of a life tenant among "my
sisters, nephews and nieces and issue of my nephews and nieces
dying prior to the death of (the life tenant)." On the death of
the life tenant there were four nephews and nieces and five
children of a deceased niece. It was held that the nephews and
nieces and issue took per stirpes, because it was clear that the
issue were to take "only in event that the parent had died." The
decisions on this type of case almost always reach the same re-
sult."' It may be doubted whether there is actually any more
evidence of intention on the part of the testator in this case than
in those previously discussed. But the close association of the
issue with persons of nearer degree makes the supposed injustice
of a per capita distribution more striking. The further question
may arise in this situation whether the issue are to take per
stirpes only with reference to other members of the class who
110 Supra note 49.
" Supra note 49.
112 Supra note 46.
113 See cases cited in Kales, op. cit. supra note 43, at sec. 579, and note
15. See also: In re Dalrymple's Will, supra note 104, where the gift was
to "the then living children or lineal descendants by right of representation,
etc."; In re Hickey, supra note 21, where the gift was to "the descendants
of my aunt A. S. or their descendants living at my death". A. S. had
children, grandchildren, and greatgrandchildren living at the death of the
testator; the court found in the repetition of the word "descendants" a
stirpetal significance.
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are not "issue", or whether the issue are to take per stirpes as
among themselves. Suppose in Matter of Lawtrcize, s'pro, one
of the five children of the deceased niece had been dead, leaving
children? Would the children and grandchildren of the deceased
niece have taken the latter's share per stirpes ?":
If, as has already been suggested, the testator does not have
in mind any definite meaning for the word "issue" as he uses it,
it might be thought that the court is free to give it whatever
meaning will most likely be consonant with what his intention
would have been had he actually turned his mind to the point.
In other words, the question might be stated thus,-"What con-
struction will most nearly approximate the probable desires of
the largest number of testators as to the effect of their gifts to
'issue'"? If we believe that the average testator who thinks
about the point specifically decides in favor of a per stirpes dis-
tribution, why should there not be a rule that such is the prima
facie meaning of the gift? Mr. Kales has said that to attribute
the stirpetal significance to a gift where there is no special con-
text to indicate such intention is to give "an unusual and highly
complex meaning to a single word." He says further: "The
word 'issue' is being made to stand elliptically for much more
than is contained in the word itself." This would seem to as-
sume that there is some fixed meaning for the word which
everyone knows and agrees to. As already pointed out, it is an
error to suppose that the testator had a definite and fi:ed mean-
ing in mind. The question is what meaning the court shall give
to the word in order best to effectuate his vaguely comprehended
scheme of distribution.
That there is a decided tendency toward a rule that in every
gift to "issue" the prima facie construction is in favor of a per
stirpes division, cannot be doubted. The leaning of the New
York court is very markedly in this direction, as the caes pre-
viously discussed indicate, although the result may be veiled be-
hind some "faint glimpse" of testamentary intention, perceived
by the court. Perhaps the most conspicuous drift toward the
rule suggested is in Massachusetts. Reference has already been
made to the decisions in that state requiring a per stirpes dis-
tribution because of the use of the word "parent"."' In Eeivzt
v. Rivers" 6 there was a gift to "the lineal heirs of L. S. R". In
holding that the greatgrandchildren of L. S. R. were entitled, and
that their children could not participate, the court said: "It is
a general rule of construction to be followed viess the testator"
has clearly mnaifested a contrar2I intention that a devise or be-
'14 See further on this point, Kales op. cit. smipra note 43, at recs. 579
and 583.
115 Supra notes 101 and 93.
11c S7pra note 59.
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quest to 'heirs' or 'issue' refers to that class of beneficiaries who
would be entitled to take under the law of intestate succession '
if the designated ancestor had died at the time fixed for ascer-
taining the class, and also indicates that the members of the class
so determined are to share in the same manner and proportions
as such persons would share under the statute relating to the
distribution of intestate estates. . . . Where a gift is made
to members of a class described as 'heirs' or 'issue' in accordance
with the rule last above stated it is held that grandchildren and
their descendants will not be allowed to compete with their
parents unless such was the intention of the testator. We find
no such intention on the part of the testator in the case at bar
.... ,117 Rembert v. Vetoe, supra, is a very interesting
decision. As has been previously suggested,1 " the result in that
case might have been put on the ground of an intention of the
testator manifested in the gift over on default of issue. But the
cour4 said that whenever there was a gift to "heirs of the body",
it was necessary to resort to the statute of descents to find out
who those persons were; "'No one can take as heir of the body
of another, unless he fulfills the description, and is not only such
a person as would take the real estate of that other under our
act of distributions, but likewise a lineal descendant." The
court then declared that "issue" was equivalent to "heirs of the
body"; therefore "issue" had to be construed in the light of the
statute, which required per stirpes distribution among lineal
descendants. In Stamford Trust Co. v. Lockwood, supra, it was
possible again to uphold the decision on the ground of intention
made manifest in the gift in default. But the court said, quoting
with approval from an earlier case: "' . . . in the absence
of words indicating a contrary intent, a will is to be interpreted
as intending to distribute an estate per stirpes, and in accordance
with the statute of distributions. "A further consideration in
favor of the per stirpes rule is, that this rule has for two cen-
turies commended itself to the judgment of the community as one
of justice, and has been and is the rule applied by the law in
case of intestate estates. In these circumstances this rule will
be applied in the construction of a will where the language of
the will leaves the intent of the testator in serious doubt."'"
In Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Bridgham1 , the court
overruled a former precedent12o and directed a per stirpes
distribution, being influenced, not only by its feeling of the
117 Italics are the writer's. See also: Jackson v. Jackson, supra note 46;
Coates v. Burton (1906) 191 Mass. 180, 77 N. E. 311; Gardiner v. Everett,
supra note 59.
I's See supra in the text of note 37.
119 Supra note 15.
120 Pearce v. Rickard, supra note 46.
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greater justice in that method, but also by a statute of the state
which provided that whenever a devise or bequest was made to
one for life and thereafter to his "issue", the word "issue" should
be construed to mean the children of the life tenant living at his
death, and the lineal descendants of such children as may have
died, such descendants taking equally among themselves the
share which their deceased parent would have taken. This
statute was obviously an attempt to abrogate, in part, at least,
the Rule in Shelley's Case, and did not cover the case at bar.
But the court thought that it did declare a legislative policy as
to the proper construction for the word "issue", and that it was
desirable to have the same construction given whether the gift
was to the issue after a life estate to the ancestor, or otherwise.
Granting in a given case that distribution is to be per stirpes,
who are the stirps? Let us suppose the typical case of a gift to
A for life, and after his death to his issue, with a context ex-
cluding application of the Rule in Shelley's Case. A had two
sons, both of whom predeceased their father, one son leaving
two children surviving the testator; and the other, three children,
and also two children of a deceased child. Is the property to be
divided into two shares, one to go to the issue of each deceased
son of A? Or is it to be divided into six shares, one for each
grandchild of A or his issue? It has been remarked already that
there is a strong tendency to rely upon the analogy of the statutes
of descent. Not infrequently those statutes expressly provide for,
or have been construed to require, division equally amonzg !!
descendavzts of equal degree. In our supposititious case this
would result in six shares rather than two. It cannot be said
that the cases throw much light upon this question.' '
Considered with respect to the preceding discussion, there can
be little doubt that Ledwith v. Hurst was wrongly decided. The
context made it apparent that the testator had used "issue" as
a word of purchase, and purchase only. There was no sufficient
indication of an intention to create a perpetual series of life
estates. Nor was there anything in the language to restrict
"issue" to "children". The gift should have been held, therefore,
to give life estates to the descendants of lary Ledwith who sur-
vived her, they taking per stirpes according to the express pro-
vision of the will, with a valid remainder to the charities.
In conclusion the writer ventures the suggestion that two devel-
opments may be looked for in the future decisions upon the con-
struction of "issue"--that an increasing number of courts will
lay it down as a rule of prima facie construction that in a will
121 In Dexter v. Iwhes, supra note 49, it is suggested that the strp3
may be the issue of the nearest degree represented at the time for distribu-
tion. Compare the Rhode Island statutory provision referred to in the
text sutpra of note 119.
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the word is one of purchase; and that in the absence of indication
of a contrary intention the division among the class taking is to
be per stirpes. Estates tail in this country are practically ex-
tincv; and the learning connected with them is fast fading from
the minds of bench and bar. The general feeling of the justice
of a per stirpes distribution and the influence of the analogy of
the statutes of descent will undoubtedly be potent factors in new
cases.
